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Abstract 
The objective of this study is to explore how far the internationalization of the RMB 
has gone so far and what the Chinese government must do to support the 
internationalization path. This paper analyzes three important aspects of this issue: the 
dimensions and function of an international currency, the costs and benefits of 
internationalizing a currency, and China's economic problems that are likely to 
influence the outcome of internationalization. If the benefits that the 
internationalization of the RMB are expected to bring to China may be offset by costs, 
the government needs to balance the challenges and costs against the benefits. Finally 
it concludes that China should be cautious about exposing its economy to dramatic 
shocks or excessive vulnerability to external influences. While the history of currency 
internationalization provides general guidance that China should not ignore, none of 
today's international currencies started the internationalization process from the same 
point as China. The Chinese government should first clarify its goal, and then 
proceed gradually with internationalization of the RMB while reforming and opening 
its financial market. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
l.lResearch Background and Significance 
The national currency of China is predicted by The World Bank to be among the 
three major reserve currencies by 2025 together with the USD and the Euro (World 
Bank 2011 :7). The Chinese government has initiated several policies that support the 
internationalization of the RMB. 
Contemporary writers in this field emphasize three main factors that contribute to 
the growing interest in this topic. 
The first is China's role in the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis, a time when it 
acted responsibly to maintain the stability of the RMB while many of its Asian 
neighbours devalued their currencies. China's influence had begun to emerge (Gao 
and Yu 2009). Thus, the RMB 's importance among its neighbours has been increased. 
The second reason, given by Park (2010), was the instability of the US financial 
system after the 2008-2009 global fmancial crisis, which increased the sense of 
urgency within and outside China about the reform of the global fmancial system. 
China's concerns were particularly acute since China has a large proportion of its 
foreign reserves in US dollars. In 2009 Zhou Xiao Chuan called for reform of the 
international monetary system, and suggested that SDR1 should be given a more 
important role while the US dollar's role should be diminished. 2 Large fluctuations 
in the US dollar and the Euro increase the cost of hedging for Chinese importers and 
exporters, leading to uncertainties in China's foreign trade and investment (Zha 2012). 
1 IMF's Special Drawing Rights 
2
" Zhou Xiaochuan: Reform the international monetary system" March 23, 2009 Retrieved April 20, 
2012 from: http://www.bis.org/review/r090402c.pdf 
2
" Zhou Xiaochuan: Reform the international monetary system" March 23, 2009 Retrieved April 20, 
2012 from: http: //www.bis.org/review/r090402c.pdf 
The third factor is related to Mundell's ( 1993: I 0) theory that "great powers have 
great currencies". China's economy has experienced a remarkable expansion, gaining 
an increasingly prominent role in the global economy. China's currency, the RMB, 
has also captured growing attention from investors and policymakers around the 
world. (Hu 2008) It is understandable that people expect the role of the RMB to 
increase in proportion to China's economic weight as the second largest economy in 
the world. 
The references cited above imply that China has reasons - both domestic and 
international - to move towards internationalizing the RMB. 
A review of economic discussion suggests that may be easier said than done. 
There have been few truly international currencies, and it took decades for them to 
achieve that status. For example, although the U.S. economy had by 1872 surpassed 
the UK's (as measured by national output), according to Chinn and Frankel (2008) 
who based their work on Triffm, Eichengreen and Flandreau, it was only after World 
War II that the dollar overtook the sterling. Some researchers are intensely 
conservative about the prospect of RMB internationalization, with some doubting the 
RMB 's ability to achieve the status of even the Yen (Kelly 2009), let alone the USD 
or the Euro. Others predict a more difficult journey, with the RMB achieving only the 
status of secondary reserve currencies such as the euro, the yen, the Swiss franc, and 
the British pound (Mallaby and Wethington 2011 ). 
The significance of this research lies in that if China succeeded in the RMB 
internationalization process it would not only increase China's monetary and political 
status but also bring significant changes to the Chinese economy itself and the 
international monetary system. China aims to avoid the loss in value caused by the 
accumulation of huge foreign reserves. If the RMB were internationalized, Chinese 
traders would be able to avoid the cost of exchange rate hedging since the payments 
could be arranged in RMB. Further, an internationalized RMB would provide the 
world with an alternative store of value, medium of exchange and unit of account. 
This might challenge the dominant role played by the US dollar and change the 
international monetary pattern. 
This paper summarizes a balance of views from within and outside China of the 
RMB and China's economic situation. It provides insights into what it means to be an 
international currency. It also reveals important political and economic implications 
of internationalization by reviewing the history of the main internationalized 
currencies. It summarizes the RMB performance and the progress to date of RMB 
internationalization. It points out the main challenges, costs and benefits facing China 
and makes policy recommendations for the Chinese government in pursuing the path 
towards RMB internationalization, and suggests further studies regarding the topic. 
1.2 Literature Review 
The internationalization of the RMB has recently been a hot topic in the fields 
of economics and political economy. The costs and benefits of internationalizing a 
currency, the factors that influence this process, and other related theories have been 
the topic of lively debate within academia and more generally in the business, 
political and economic media. 
1.2.1 Functions and dimensions of an international currency 
This section sets out the criteria for an international currency, illustrates the 
pertinent Chinese government policies for each of these criteria, and evaluates the 
extent to which the RMB meets them today. 
There is no universally supported framework that defines an international 
currency. However, there is much common ground among influential writers, and 
theoretical discussions provide guidelines that will be used to identify the dimensions 
of an international currency and the functions it performs. 
Definition of an international currency 
An international currency is used beyond its home country, not only for 
transactions among residents, but also among residents and non-residents (Cohen 
1971 , Kenen 1983). 
Money has three classical domestic functions : it is a store of value, a medium 
of exchange and a unit of account. Cohen and Kenen applied these criteria to 
international currencies. Frankel summarized the criteria in Table 1 (Chinn and 
Frankel 2005). 
Table 1 Dimensions of an international currency 
Function of Money Governments Private actors 
Store of Value International reserves Currency substitution 
(private dollarization) and 
investment ( portfolio 
allocation) 
Medium of Exchange Foreign exchange market Vehicle currency, 
intervention invoicing trade and 
financial transactions, 
settlement currency 
Unit of account Anchor for pegging local Denominating trade and 
currency financial transactions 
Source: Chtnn and Frankel2005 m Yu 2012:4 
Ito provided a somewhat different view, summarized in Table 3 below. 
Table 2 Dimensions of an international currency 
Official sector Private sector 
Unit of Account Being pegged by other Trade invoicing 
countries Denomination of financial 
Use in currency baskets of products 
foreign central banks 
SDR composition currency 
Denomination of 
government bonds 
Medium of Exchange Currency circulation Trade and fmancial 
(Settlement) 
abroad transactions 
Government financial 
transactions (such as 
ODA) Central bank swaps 
Currency intervention 
Store of Value Foreign reserves (of other Cross-border deposits 
countries) Cross-border securities 
Source: Ito 2011 in Yu 2012:4 
There are two main differences between Table 1 and Table 2. 1) Ito put 
"Trade invoicing" and "Denomination of financial products" under the category of 
"Unit of Account", while in Table 1, Frankel placed "Trade invoicing" under 
"Medium of Exchange". 2) Ito made a clear distinction between the role of settlement 
and invoicing. Unlike Chinn and Frankel, Ito noted that even when a currency is used 
for invoicing, it is fairly common that the settlement is made in another currency (Yu 
2012). 
Table 2 will be used as the mam reference for the detailed analysis of 
dimensions of international currencies in the following pages as it more closely 
matches contemporary definitions of currency functions. 
In reviewing the RMB 's performance towards an internationalized currency, 
one line of the research argues that the RMB 's progress towards becoming an 
international currency has been very limited. The RMB has progressed into functions 
such as "trade invoicing", "trade payment/settlements", and "being included in other's 
currency baskets and central bank swaps". However, there has been limited or no 
progress of the RMB into other international currency functions (Ito, 2011,Yu 2012). 
And as Chovanec (2012) reminded, the "swaps" are not a strong indication of 
internationalization because they serve only as emergency back-ups to prevent 
financial crises. No global market exists for banks to replenish their RMB balances. 
Another group of researchers is more optimistic, Chu (20 1 0), Zhao and Song 
(2009), believe that widespread use of the RMB in trade settlement would be a 
breakthrough point for the internationalization of the RMB. The demand for currency 
as a unit of account and medium of exchange is determined by the structure and 
breadth of a country's trade network (closely linked to its economic size) and 
invoicing practices (Maziad and Kang 2012). Taking advantage of its wide trade 
networks for using the RMB as a medium of exchange may provide a path for China 
to enhance the RMB 's progress towards internationalization. 
This paper shares Cohen's view (2012b) that the Chinese government has 
made much progress along the trade track but limited progress along the financial 
track- reforming external capital control and domestic financial markets. Although 
China's wide trade network is a major advantage, the fmancial track is more 
important and essential. 
1.2.2 Factors that determine currency internationalization 
Researchers have studied the successful internationalization of the Pound, the 
USD and the Euro to understand which factors determine currency 
internationalization. 
Chinn and Frankel (2005) identified five important variables:3 1) Patterns of 
output and trade 2) Financial markets 3) Political Stability 4) Confidence in the 
currency's value 5) Network externalities. Helleiner (2008) added that the economic 
and political relations between the issuing countries and other countries, 
policymakers' decisions, and other states' attitudes towards the currency's role, are all 
political economy factors to be considered. 
Cohen (2012b) argued that an issuing country couldn't control demand for 
their internationalized currency. Maziad and Kang (2012) found that demand for the 
RMB is driven by China's global economic role and wide trade network, and rapid 
offshore market development. 
This paper argues that the above theories are not individually sufficient; it 
aggregates the major related important theories and argues that both economic and 
political factors are of core importance. In China's case, if the government continues 
to adopt policies to facilitate the internationalization of the RMB, it really helps the 
internationalization path. China's large trade network increases the expectation that 
the RMB will be heavily used as trade transaction and invoicing currency. Since 
China has the second largest economy in the world, and China's economic policies 
and high-sustained economic growth rate drive expectations that the RMB will 
3 Among the relevant references are Aliber ( 1966), Alogoskoufis and Portes (I 992), Bergsten ( 1975), 
Black (1989), Eichengreen and Frankel (1996), Eichengreen and Mathieson (2000), Frankel (1992, 
1995), Kenen (1983), Krugman (I 984), Kindle berger (1981), Matsuyama, Kiyotaki and Matsui (1993), 
McKinnon (1969, 1979), Portes and Rey (1998), Rey (2001), Swoboda (1969), Tavlas (1993), and 
Tavlas and Ozeki (1992). 
appreciate, to the demand for the RMB depends on whether it is appealing to 
international investors as an investment currency, and to countries as a reserve 
currency. However, attention should still be given to the main factors that drive 
demand for the RMB. This paper argues that demand is largely driven by confidence 
in the currency's future value and international status, and by short-term speculation 
of RMB appreciation. 
The project will be based on assessing the secondary literature usmg 
qualitative dominated multi-methods. This paper adopts a political economy 
approach to study this issue, focusing on theoretical discussions. Triangulation will be 
uses since it is an important means of validating information gathered using 
qualitative methodologies. It refers to the principle of neutralizing biases by 
diversifying perspectives and continuously crosschecking information using different 
tools and sources. 4 
1.3 Outline of the Paper 
The Second Chapter analyzes the extent to which the RMB has gone so far as 
an international currency, and compares its performance to existing international 
currencies and the factors that influence the roles of international currencies. The 
discussion includes: 
1) A brief overview of how a few international currencies made the transition towards 
internationalization. 
2) The extent to which the RMB bears the characteristics of an international currency 
by comparing pertinent Chinese government policies with international currency 
4 Saprin Guidelines for Research Methodology 
theory criteria. 
3) A review of what the Chinese government has done so far to promote RMB 
internationalization, and evaluation of the underlying policies. 
4) Challenges for RMB internationalization moving forward. 
The Third Chapter analyzes whether this is the right time to internationalize 
the RMB. This is done by : 
1) Analyzing the costs and benefits China would likely experience from 
internationalization of the RMB; 
2) Summarizing the path of RMB internationalization; 
3) Suggesting policy guidelines for the Chinese government. 
The Fourth Chapter draws conclusions about the main fmdings of this 
research, discusses the trend and speed of RMB internationalization in the near future, 
and suggests avenues for further study of this issue. 
Chapter 2: RMB's performance and comparison 
2.1 Brief history of currency internationalization 
A review of the history of the internationalization of the U.S. dollar, the Euro 
and the Yen illustrates the complicated process of currency internationalization. It 
shows that a country's intentions to internationalize its own currency are not sufficient 
by themselves. It also illustrates which political and economic factors were 
interrelated with internationalization of these currencies. This review identifies 
challenges China will face as it moves towards internationalizing the RMB. 
2.2.1 The U.S. Dollar 
By the beginning of the 20th Century, the U.S. had become the world's most 
powerful country. At the outbreak of World War I in 1914, U.S. economic output was 
on the verge of overtaking the whole of Europe ( Kennedy 1989). The U.S. Dollar 
played a growing role in the global monetary system. 
Although the U.S. economy had surpassed the UK's economy by 1872 
(measured by national output) it wasn't until after World War II that the dollar 
overtook the Pound sterling. Eichengreen (2011 a) has argued that the dollar overtook 
the sterling in the mid-1920s. Previously, Krugman (1984) in Frankel (20 12), who had 
introduced the importance of network externalities (choosing to use a currency 
because everyone else does so), estimated the lag between economic size dominance 
and currency dominance at half a century (Frankel 20 12). 
The U.S. Dollar reached its summit in 1944, with the creation of The Bretton 
Woods Exchange Rate System involving 44 main countries. It established the U.S. 
Dollar's leading role in the global economy. The essence of the system was that the 
U.S. Dollar was pegged to gold, and the value of other countries ' currencies was 
pegged to the U.S. dollar (Stephey 2008). With the U.S. Dollar reaching the core 
position of the global currency, other countries had to store dollars as the currency of 
settlement. As trade expanded, these countries had to store more and more U.S. 
Dollars. This resulted in the US developing a long-term trade deficit. The premise of a 
core currency is that its value remains stable and firm. But the need for stability and 
the broadening trade deficit are in conflict. This inner contradiction is the so-called 
Triffin Dilemma (Triffin 1960). 
By 1971, President Nixon announced that the US would give up the dollar peg 
to gold. The Bretton Woods System had broken down. The crisis of the Bretton 
Woods system can be seen as a particular and very dramatic instance of the clash of 
national economic regulation with the logic of internationalism. (James, 1996) The 
United States had also exploited its position, whether consciously or unconsciously, as 
the "international natural lender of last resort", meaning that the US was using the 
role of the US dollar to pursue its own interests, causing economic problems and risks 
for other countries by putting pressure on the exchange rate. The US was using its 
economic power to its own advantage, just as Europe did in the late 1900's. (Bowles, 
2007) 
In spite of the collapse of the Bretton Woods System the US dollar retained its 
dominant position. The use of the US dollar as a reserve currency is still increasing 
each year. And the dollar is still the most used currency in trading and fmancial fields . 
As can be seen from Table 4 below, the dollar's contribution in foreign exchange 
transaction keeps its high range, being always more than double of the Euro 's, with 
the Japanese Yen ranking third, and the RMB included in other currencies. This 
continues because of the dominance of the US dollar, the economic strength of the 
US, and its currently unbeatable role on the world financial and political stage. 
Table 3 Currency Distributions in Foreign Exchange Transactions 
Currency 2001 2004 2007 2011 
US dollar 89.9 88.0 85.6 84.9 
Euro 37.9 37.4 37.0 39.1 
Japanese Yen 23.5 20.8 17.2 19.0 
Pound Sterling 13.0 16.5 14.9 12.9 
Australian Dollar 4.3 6.0 6.6 7.6 
Swiss Franc 6.0 6.0 6.8 6.4 
Other currencies 25.4 15.3 31.9 30.1 
Source: Bank oflnternational Settlement (BIS), Triennial Bank Survey, and 
2010 Notes: Since two currencies are involved in every transaction, the sum of 
percentage share of individual currencies equals 200% in WTO (2012) 
2.2.2 The Euro 
The Euro is the currency of the 1 7 member states of the European economic 
union comprising the "Eurozone". 
The Euro replaced national currencies on January 1, 2002 (Bowles 2007). 
Since the Euro came into use, it has been the second most widely held international 
reserve currency after the US dollar. Its share as a reserve currency increased from 
17.9% in 1999 to 26.5% in 2011 (though it dropped to 24.15% in the third quarter of 
201 0). 5 This growth prompted many economists to debate whether the Euro will 
replace the US dollar as the dominant reserve currency, in view of the economic and 
financial market forecast of the EU (Chinn and Frankel 2005). However, since the 
5 See appendix I , COFER, the percentage regards to allocated reserves 
2008 financial crisis, the Euro's share of the worldwide currency has increased much 
more slowly. The benefits flowing from the adoption of a single currency in the Euro 
Zone is increasing intra-zone trading with decreasing transaction costs, and increasing 
liquidity of the currency, with all Eurozone fmancial markets benefiting from the 
growing transaction's volumes. However, the disadvantage comes that, with the 
elimination of different exchange rate between the union's participants, it would no 
longer be possible to let the exchange rate absorb shocks that asymmetrically affects 
the monetary union's various regions (Swoboda 1999). 
One of the problems mentioned by Cohen (2012a) was that the Euro Zone 
allowed all to enjoy the benefits of a supranational currency without asking the 
member countries to give up many of their national rights and privileges. Though 
countries share the same monetary policy, they all have different fiscal policies. The 
PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain) have huge fiscal deficit problems caused by 
their unsustainable overhang of liabilities. The vulnerability of the Euro Zone is 
remarkable even if the Union itself is reluctant to admit it. Euro-sceptics such as 
Barro (2012), Feldstein (2012), Roubini (2011), Rachman (2010) and Munchau 
(20 11) predicted a failure of the Euro and the Eurozone, comparing it to a failed 
experiment or a broken marriage (all in Cohen 2012a). 
2.2.3 The Japanese Yen 
After Word War II, Japan's weight in terms of share of global GDP and in 
terms of share of global trade showed a rapid increase, which made the Japanese Yen 
able to meet the first criterion for internationalization. However it was only in 1960-
73 that the Japanese government first allowed foreigners to acquire important classes 
of Japanese assets. Full account convertibility came only in 1964 under the IMF 
Articles of Agreement restored. The main driving force that pressured the Yen into 
internationalization came from the US with the Yen/Dollar Agreement in 1984. 
During 1987-89 Japan's stock market and real estate market developed substantial 
asset bubbles. Afterwards, in 1996 the Japanese government launched a package of 
financial liberalization policies hoping to recover the country's economy and to 
promote the country as a financial center. This failed to reverse Tokyo's decline as one 
of the top financial centres in the world (Takagi in Frankel2012). Today, the Yen is an 
international currency ranking roughly as high as the Pound sterling and above the 
Swiss franc (Frankel2012). 
The internationalization of the Japanese Yen was an example of currency 
internationalization poorly executed. 
There are some similarities between China's current economic situation and 
Japan's bubble era before it internationalized its currency. An undervalued exchange 
rate and exceptionally high savings rate have fuelled export-led growth and the world 
biggest current account surplus. Vast excess capacity and falling returns on capital 
have been stimulated by continual overinvestment. Bad loans have risen as the result 
of excessive bank lending, and bubbles formed in the markets for shares and real 
estate (The Economist 201 0). These factors, together with the side effects observed 
after Japan's liberalization of its financial markets, and the failure of Yen 
internationalization, are thought to have made the Chinese government reluctant to 
liberalize its financial markets. However, these comparisons overlook important 
differences. The internationalization of the Japanese Yen was mainly encouraged and 
driven by the US, while the Chinese government has independently and intentionally 
taken measured steps to internationalize the RMB. Further, the scale of China's 
economy today is far larger than Japan 's was in the 1990s. This paper argues that the 
internationalization of the RMB benefits from both a stronger economy and 
intentional policy support than that of the Yen. It could be argued that whereas Japan 
was pushed by the US to internationalize its currency, China has embarked on the 
internationalization path independently and for its own reasons. 
2.2 The RMB performance so far 
RMB as a Unit of account 
The RMB has begun to be used in trade invoicing in the private sector. (Ito 
2011) Offshore Renminbi bonds ("dim sum" bonds) have been issued since 2007 
(Saidi, Prasad, Salomoni, 2011). 
In 2010 McDonalds6 and Caterpillar became the first important multinational 
companies to issue RMB-denominated notes, exemplifying the trend of increasing 
foreign demand for RMB-denominated financial products. They were the first RMB-
denominated bonds ever issued by non-financial foreign firms in 201l(Saidi, Prasad, 
Salomoni, 20 II). In the same year, the total issuance of Dim Sum bonds reached 108 
billion, triple the figure for the previous year. Dim Sum bonds and RMB-
denominated notes are now listed on the Luxembourg stock exchange. This is 
evidence of the growing popularity of these instruments (Herrero, Schwartz, Xia 
2012). 
Besides the government bonds mentioned in the last paragraph, as a unit of 
account in the official sector a currency needs also to be pegged against other 
currencies, used in currency baskets of foreign central banks, and included in the SDR 
composition currency. Since the RMB is non-convertible, no country uses it as an 
anchor currency. And even if the Hong Kong dollar might be a possible candidate 
6 Original in Financial Times 
(currently pegged to the US dollar), Hong Kong's economic law requires the free flow 
of capital within the region and the free convertibility of the Hong Kong dollar 
(Bowles and Wang 2011 ). According to Ito's (20 11) analysis, (after controlling for the 
U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, and the euro), the weight of RMB as a basket currency 
in Asian economies is as follows: Singapore 49%, Indonesia and Malaysia 40%-46%, 
Thailand, Taiwan and India 30%-39%. 7 These high percentages illustrate the RMB's 
influence on other Asian currencies. 
Another recent discussion related to the RMB as a unit of account focuses on 
the possible inclusion of the RMB in the IMF's SDR, a basket currency comprising 
the US dollar, yen, euro and pound sterling, created in 1969 to supplement IMF 
member countries' reserves. Every 5 years the IMF reviews the composition of the 
basket. At the last review in November 2010, the RMB was suggested for inclusion, 
but due to its lack of full capital account convertibility it was finally excluded. The 
next review will be in 2015 (Huang Z. in Bowles and Wang 2011). 
RMB as a medium of exchange 
The RMB is increasingly used internationally as a medium of exchange. In 
the official sector, the People's Bank of China has started bilateral swap agreements 
with Argentina8 (RMB is acting as a payment currency), Belarus ( RMB is acting as a 
reserve currency), Brazil 9 , Hong Kong ( because as the second largest RMB 
distribution center in the world, HK needs abundant currency supply), Iceland, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, (bilateral trade settlement need) Singapore, South Korea ( to 
7 
Technical study based on Basket Currency Regressions, for details refer to (Ito, Ogawa, and Sasaki 
(1998), Ogawa and Ito (2002), Ogawa and Sakane (2006), Ito 20 10) 
8 http ://www .chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-03/31 /content_7635007 .htm 
9 http ://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/O 15f526a-bc07-ll e l-9aff-OO 144feabdcO.html 
facilitate the fmancing of China-based Korean companies), Uzbekistan 10 , New 
Zealand 1 1, and Japan 12 that perform a similar function to central bank liquidity swaps. 
Its main objective is to solve short-term liquidity problems and to keep the stability of 
the financial system, but it also helps to expand the RMB 's usage and to accelerate its 
internationalization. 13 
Trade and financial transactions are the currency's main roles in the private 
sector. In countries like Lao PDR, Vietnam, and Myanmar the RMB has been used in 
border trade for settlement. In Mongolia sixty per cent of the cash in circulation is in 
RMB. RMB can be used in Hong Kong, Vietnam, Taiwan and South Korea. 
Cambodia and Nepal also welcome the official circulation of the RMB in their 
markets. (Ito 2011) With the launch of "RMB Cross Border Trade Settlement Pilot 
Scheme" in 2009, trade settlement in RMB was allowed for cross-border trade 
between Hong Kong and other cities in East Asia, as well as five mainland cities in 
China- Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Dongguan ( Frankel2012, J.P. 
Morgan 2013, Park 2010). In 2010, deregulation was extended to twenty provinces, 
municipalities, and autonomous regions, including Beijing. Another eleven provinces 
and autonomous regions were permitted to use RMB in cross-border trade settlement 
and with trading partners anywhere in the world in 2011 (Ito 2011). And in 2012, the 
People's Bank of China (PBoC) announced that all the companies that have import-
export certificates in China are allowed RMB-trade settlement of export goods. 
According to PBoC data, by the end of 20 11 RMB cross border settlement had 
10 http:/ /uzpedia.blogspot.com/20 II /04/uzbekistan-signs-currency-swap-deal.html 
11 "China, New Zealand sign 25 bin Yuan currency swap deal" April 18'h 2011 Source: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/20 ll /04/18/china-newzealand-swaps-idUSL3E7FIOLH20 II 0418 
12 "RMB-Yen currency swap starts June 2012" May 301h 2012 Source: 
http:/ /blog.hiddenharmonies.org/20 12/05/rmb-yen-currency-swap-starts-june-20 12/ 
13 Source: People's Bank of China 
reached 2.08 trillion Yuan.14 
RMB as a store of value 
In the official sector, its being held in the foreign reserves of other countries 
represents a currency's status as a store of value. According to the IMP 's COFER 
(Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves) data (see Appendix 
1 ), the USD is still playing a dominant role as an international reserve currency, with 
the Euro being stable in second place with less than half the weight of the USD 
amount. Meanwhile the RMB's weight as a store of value internationally is so low 
that it is classified in the " other currencies" category 15 • The problem causing the 
RMB 's limited role as an official international reserve currency is its lack of full 
convertibility. Because of this, central banks have little incentive to hold the RMB as 
an official reserve currency. 
However, a growing number of countries are moving towards the inclusion of 
RMB in their Foreign Exchange Reserves. Recently Nigeria, Chile, Malaysia, India 
and other countries announced their intention to include the RMB in their foreign 
exchange reserves. 16 In 2006 the central bank of the Philippines accepted the RMB as 
a reserve currency. And Belarus, Malaysia, Korea, and Cambodia have also begun 
using RMB as a reserve currency (Financial News, in Bowles and Wang 2011). 
In the private sector, when a currency serves as an internationally accepted 
store of value, foreign investors must be permitted to trade it in denominating deposits 
and securities (Ito 2011 ). Chinese debt securities mainly involve RMB denominated 
bonds. In June 2005 China issued its bonds under the Asian Bond Fund. Following 
this, governments and corporate borrowers started to issue RMB-denominated bonds 
14 The People ' s Bank of China data, source: http ://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/963/index.htrnl 
15 IMF 2012 data, source: http ://www.imf.org/external/index.htrn 
16 People ' s Daily Online 2011 , source: http://english.peopledaily.corn.cn/ 
in Hong Kong. In July 2010 conditions for bond issuers were liberalized and it was 
announced that there would be no restrictions on types of issue or volumes for 
offshore RMB bond issues. In addition, the QFII (Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investors) and QDII (Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors) programs allow 
investors to engage in cross-border capital account transactions. Since August 2011 
foreign investors have been permitted to make direct investments in China using 
RMB obtained from cross-border trade settlement, or from holding RMB bonds and 
/or stocks (Bowles and Wang 2011 ). 
Chinese equity securities come in three forms. A-shares are domestic equities 
traded by domestic residents. B-shares are denominated in RMB and traded in USD 
by foreigners. H-shares are traded in HK dollars in Hong Kong. However, capital 
control causes differences in A-share and H-share prices. Ito suggests that as long as 
the capital control holds, Chinese capital assets' volatility and arbitrage will continue 
to exist and international investment in Chinese equity securities will not rise 
appreciably (Ito 2011 ). 
The Overall performance of the RMB 
Data from HSBC and Hong Kong Monetary Authority shows the significant 
expansion of the RMB's offshore use. China's RMB-denominated trade experienced a 
growth rate of 464% from 2010 to 2011. China's RMB deposits have increased from 
895 million Yuan in Feb 2004 to a peak of 627,302 million Yuan in Nov. 2011. The 
issuance of RMB bonds increased by 320% between 2010 and 2011, and China's 
RMB borrowing increased by 1,450% in the same period. 17 
Despite this impressive growth, there are limitations m the RMB 's 
development as an international currency. Analyzing the RMB 's performance m 
17 Sources: WTO report, HSBC, HKMA, financial media reports 
relation to the three functions of an international currency set out previously, it has 
made substantial progress on "trade invoicing", "trade payment/settlements", and 
"being included in other's currency baskets and central bank swaps". However, it has 
made limited or no progress on the other functions (Ito, 20ll,Yu 2012). The main 
barriers to its progress in other categories evidently lie in the currency's non-
convertibility, and in the strict government control of China's financial markets, 
which encourages arbitrage between onshore and offshore markets. The trade track 
for internationalizing the RMB pursued by the Chinese government is progressing 
well, but the fmancial track requires more effort (Cohen 2012). Ultimately, it is the 
financial track that matters more. Financial factors are likely to be the key 
determinants of how far the RMB 's internationalization will go. 
2.3 What the Chinese government has done so far 
The Chinese government has made efforts to internationalize its currency in 
three areas: 
1) Currency swap agreements with other Countries 
The Chiang Mai initiative between 2001 and 2004 was the first round of 
China's bilateral currency swap agreements with its six members (Thailand, Japan, 
South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia) worth USD 23.5 billion (Gao and 
Yu, 2009). 
After the 2008 financial crisis the Chinese central bank initiated bilateral 
currency swap agreements aiming to make it easier for international companies and 
traders to receive financing in RMB during difficult economic periods (Swiss Metal 
Assets 2012). Swap agreements were also set up between the Chinese and foreign 
central banks to mitigate foreign exchange risk (Yau and Fung 2013). The countries 
that have local currency swap agreements with China are listed in Table 1. 
Table 4: China's bilateral local currency swap agreements with foreign central 
banks (in billion Yuan) as of January 14, 2013 
Partner Date of initial Amount Date of Amount 
agreement RMB initial/Latest RMB 
billion Agreement billion 
1 Hong Kong Monetary 201h Jan 2009 200 22 Nov 2011 400 
Authority 
2 Bank Negara 81h Feb 2009 80 8 Feb 2012 180 
Malaysia 
3 National Bank of the 11 th Mar 2009 20 11 Mar 2009 20 
Republic of Belarus 
4 Bank of Indonesia 23 Mar 2009 100 23 Mar 2009 100 
5 Central bank of 29 Mar2009 70 29 Mar 2009 70 
Argentina 
6 Bank of Korea 20 Apr 2009 180 26 Oct 2011 360 
7 Central Bank of 9 Jun 2010 3.5 9 Jun 2010 3.5 
Iceland 
8 Monetary Authority 23 Jul2010 150 23 Jul2010 150 
of Singapore 
9 New Zealand Reserve 18 Apr 2011 25 18 Apr 2011 25 
Bank 
10 Central Bank of the 19 Apr 2011 0.7 19 Apr 2011 0.7 
Republic of 
Uzbekistan 
11 Central Bank of 6May 2011 5 20 Mar 2012 10 
Mongolia 
12 National Bank of 13 Jun 2011 7 13 Jun 2010 7 
Kazakhstan 
13 Bank of Thailand 12 Dec 2011 70 
14 State Bank of Pakistan 23 Dec 2011 10 
15 Central Bank of 17 Jan 2012 35 
United Arab Emirates 
16 Central Bank of 21 Feb 2012 10 
Republic of Turkey 
17 Reserve Bank of 22 Mar 2012 200 
Australia 
18 Central Bank of Brazil 21 Jun 2012 190 
19 National Bank of 26 Jun 2012 15 
Ukraine 
Total 841 .2 1,856.2 
Source: The European Fmanc1al Revtew 2013 
Table 4 shows that the total amount of the bilateral swap agreements between 
the Chinese and foreign central banks had reached 1,856.2 billion RMB by January 
141h 2013 . Recent news also reported that the UK and China have discussed 
establishing a reciprocal 3-year, RMB/sterling currency swap, which would help the 
direct investment and finance trade between the UK and China and support domestic 
financial stability (Gov. UK 2013). 
2) Establishment of offshore currency centers (London and HK) 
Hong Kong is the dominant offshore RMB trading center, with a daily 
turnover of RMB 1.5 - 2 billion. (Yau and Fung 2013) It has been established as the 
RMB offshore market since 2004, and since then RMB deposits were allowed in 
Hong Kong. China has established Hong Kong as a controlled experimental offshore 
hub for RMB trading, a market denoted as "CNH". This abbreviation stands for 
"Chinese Yuan deliverable in Hong Kong". Beijing has created an onshore and an 
offshore market for its currency to restrict the flow of the RMB in and out of the 
mainland. This is considered a step toward letting the RMB trade freely one day. 
London's RMB trading center was started to develop its role as the West's offshore 
trading center for the RMB in April2012. At the same time, HSBC launched the first 
RMB bond market outside China and Hong Kong (Cummings 2012). Offshore 
trading in RMB has impressively sped up the increase of trading volume (Yau and 
Fung 2013). 
(3) Border trade 
Limited RMB-denominated banking services to Hong Kong residents and 
specified business customers were offered by banks in Hong Kong beginning in 
February 2004. Under a pilot scheme started in July 2009, participant banks in Hong 
Kong were permitted to engage in the settlement of RMB trade transactions. This was 
extended to cover twenty provinces and cities in China in June 201 0 as well as 
making RMB trade and other current account item settlement available in all 
countries (Yau and Fung 2013). Since March 2012, trading entities all over th~ world 
can settle trade in RMB subject to local restrictions (Ni 2012). In 2012, the total RMB 
trade settlement handled by Hong Kong banks exceeded 2,600 billion Yuan ($413 
billion) having an increase of37% over last year. (ChinaDaily.com 2013) 
Policy evaluation 
The above measures taken by the Chinese government shows its taking steps 
towards tackling the dilemma of promoting the internationalization of a currency that 
is not fully convertible. There is a limited but potential role played by the swap 
agreements, border trade and offshore market development promoted by the Chinese 
government and its international counterparts. The swap agreements were initiated for 
crisis response, but the Chinese government also uses them to challenge the Dollar's 
position in those countries and to promote bilateral trade and direct investment 
between China and each partner in local currencies (Liao and McDowell 2013). The 
pilot project is established to experiment and quicken capital account liberalization 
and fully convertibility of the RMB. However, the path that the Chinese government 
intends to take is not clear. It appears that the government is proceeding towards 
RMB internationalization through "crossing the river by feeling the stones". A well-
designed long-term plan and short-term policy to coordinate with the long-term plan 
should be publicized to show a stronger and clearer intention of RMB 
internationalization. 
2.4 Challenges for RMB internationalization moving forward 
2.4.1 Strictly controlled financial market 
In the history of internationalization of currencies, there is no parallel for a 
developing country highly dependent on exports and investment, and which has 
maintained a high rate of economic growth through a combination of authoritarian 
state capitalism, capital controls, a closed and government-controlled banking sector, 
and a less than fully convertible currency. 
As China's financial market is still under strict control of the Government and 
the RMB is not a fully convertible currency, fmancial liberalization and full 
convertibility of the currency is the key barrier to RMB internationalization (Frankel 
2011, Eichengreen 2011, Cohen 2012, Yu 2012 etc.). All the existing international 
currencies are fully convertible, the issuing countries of these currencies are all 
developed countries, and they already had efficient fmancial markets at the time their 
currencies were internationalized. Advanced countries are more able to resist external 
shocks due to their more efficient fmancial markets. Gong (2010) Kose (2006) offered 
robust evidence that capital account liberalization creates long-term benefits for 
developing countries through increases in economic growth, reduced inflation, and 
higher returns on equity. In the short term, however, volatility in capital flows could 
cause deflation, inflation and even economic crises (Shih and Shirk 2012). This 
suggests that the internationalization of China's currency is both unprecedented and 
more complicated since it is a developing country with an inefficient financial system. 
If China declined to liberalize its fmancial market, the RMB may not become 
competitive with international currencies whose issuing countries benefit from 
liberalized financial markets. History shows that a currency's attractiveness to 
investors has an essential impact on the currency's international status. Usually, to be 
an attractive store of value, currency convertibility and a depth and openness of 
financial markets are required (Maziad and Kang 2012). Currencies with limits on 
liberalization face higher transaction costs, which inhibit their wide acceptance, 
particularly when there is competition from alternative currencies (Genberg 20 I 0). If 
there is no progress towards capital account liberalization and full convertibility, 
foreign investors are less likely to fmd the RMB an attractive currency to hold. 
However, the liberalization of the capital account will be neither easy nor 
painless. China's problem in liberalizing its financial system has four aspects: First, 
China has a fragile economic system and suffers from over-monetization (Gao and Yu 
2009). China's whole economy is internally unbalanced, with cheap credit for 
business, negative real interested rates on deposits, subsidised land and subsidised 
input prices (Pettis 2013) making financial reform even more difficult and 
complicated. Capital controls removal would likely lead to considerable capital 
outflows. Secondly, cross-border capital flows could destabilize Chinese asset prices 
due the lack of depth of China's capital market. Thirdly, China's economic structure is 
inflexible. Fourthly, China's financial institutions and national firms lack 
competitiveness and are not able to adjust quickly to exchange rate and interest rate 
fluctuation (Gao and Yu 2009 and Chavotier 2012). All these show the 
inappropriateness for China to take the liberalization step without rebalancing its 
economy, reforming its domestic financial market, and strengthening its financial 
institutions. But they also reveal that a gradual financial liberalization may be 
appropriate in view of China's particular and complicated fmancial and economic 
circumstances. 
2.4.2 Structure imbalance of RMB cross-border settlement 
The RMB cross-border settlement is unbalanced since "Import settlement 
spending is much larger than export balance sheet income". Import settlement-
spending accounts for 80% of the total RMB cross-border settlement. This reflects the 
lack of a well-established RMB back flowing channel, and is symptomatic ofthe 
limits in domestic fmancial market openness. Besides that, there are also imbalances 
in current account and capital account settlement ratios. RMB cross-border 
settlements under the capital account are taken on a case-by-case basis and gradually 
opened with limitations, and this may be difficult to change in a short period (Ba 
2012). 
2.4.3 Offshore market arbitrage 
There are two kinds of speculation that exist between onshore and offshore 
market. 1) Taking advantage of the spot spread between onshore and offshore. 18 This 
will end up in an unbalanced 19 RMB cross-border trade settlement between the 
Mainland and Hong Kong. When the RMB spot price in Hong Kong is higher than on 
the Mainland, the stock of RMB in Hong Kong rises. When the RMB spot price in 
Hong Kong is lower than in Mainland, the stock of RMB in Hong Kong falls. 2) 
Taking advantage of expectations of RMB appreciation. When the market is expecting 
the RMB to appreciate, companies or financial institutions borrow US dollars and 
18 Which means when the Hong Kong RMB spot price is higher than the RMB spot prices in the 
Mainland, Mainland exporters will choose to sell the US dollars gained from export in the Mainland. 
And Mainland importers will choose to purchase the US dollars for import. Vice versa, when the Hong 
Kong RMB spot price is lower than that one in the Mainland, Mainland exporters will choose to sell 
the US dollars gained from export in Hong Kong, and Mainland importers will choose to buy the US 
dollars for import. (He and Zhang 2012:6) 
19 When the RMB spot price in Honk Kong is higher than that one in Mainland, the RMB amount paid 
for import by Mainland companies is larger than the RMB received from export. And when the RMB 
spot price in Honk Kong is lower than in Mainland, the RMB paid for import decreases and the RMB 
received for export increases. (He and Zhang 2012 :8) 
change it into RMB in the Hong Kong market at the same time as they sell the RMB 
in the forward market and buy US dollars. This results in an increase in US dollar 
loans and RMB deposits in the Hong Kong market when there is appreciation 
expectation for the RMB. And when the converse is expected, it drives an increase in 
US dollar deposits and RMB loans in the Hong Kong market (He and Zhang 2012). 
There are also two kinds of interest arbitrage occurring between the onshore 
and offshore markets. 1) Overseas loans under domestic guarantee: Mainland banks 
issue letters of guarantee to mainland enterprises that have assets pledged to these 
banks. The enterprises then use the letters of guarantee as pledges for RMB loans 
through their offshore companies incorporated in Hong Kong. 
Due to the significant spread in loan interest rates between the Mainland and 
Hong Kong, the overseas loan under domestic guarantee can significantly reduce 
corporate financing cost. 2) Since interest rates in Hong Kong are lower than in 
Mainland, enterprises and financial institutions issue RMB bonds offshore. Many 
mainland companies and fmancial institutions take this route to get the spread 
between the cost of issuing the bonds in Hong Kong and in the mainland (He and 
Zhang 20 12). 
If arbitrage opportunities between and onshore and offshore markets continue 
to exist, once the expectation of RMB appreciation or the interest rate and exchange 
rate spread between the two markets disappear, the process of RMB 
internationalization is likely to be negatively influenced. (He and Zhang 2012) 
Expansion of feedback and arbitrage channels between onshore and offshore markets 
would be driven by the strong demand for RMB assets. Effectiveness of credit 
rationing onshore could be undermined since mainland businesses have more access 
to credit through offshore subsidiaries of mainland banks or issue RMB bonds 
offshore. Large Chinese firms disintermediate from onshore banking system and 
borrow directly or forge ties with banks offshore. And with offshore banks directly 
extending credit to firms onshore it would eventually undermine the onshore credit 
controls and government management of interest rates. (Maziad and Kang 2012) The 
establishment of the Hong Kong offshore market has actually allowed importers to 
purchase US dollars from foreign speculators in Hong Kong rather than from the 
central bank, and exporters prefer to receive payments in US dollars, later selling 
them to the central bank. This not only has reversed the RMB 's internationalization 
initiative of reducing China's US dollar holdings, but also has helped to artificially 
prop up the value of the dollar (Mallaby and Wethington 2011 ). 
Chapter 3: Cost, benefits to China and to the world 
The internationalization of a currency creates costs and benefits. Analysis of 
these helps a country to weigh whether the internationalization of its currency is a 
worthwhile political and economic policy objective. 
3.1 Benefits of internationalizing the RMB 
A general analysis of the potential benefits and costs for a country to 
internationalize its currency and the specific challenges that China is faced will be 
presented in this chapter. This paper uses aggregated theories and observations in the 
realms of political science and economics. 
The benefits a country may realize from internationalizing its currency are set 
out below. 
1) Reduced Transaction Costs: Countries whose currenctes are 
internationalized benefit from reduced transaction costs and lower exchange rate risk. 
Importers and exporters in China would be expected to reap microeconomic 
advantages from the elimination of the exchange rate risk if invoiced and settled trade 
were in RMB (included in the microeconomic level by Cohen 2011, 2012b). This 
would also make negotiation between trading partners easier (Ito 2011 ). The 
internationalization of the RMB would also boost cross-border transactions; enlarge 
bilateral trade and economic cooperation. This could be particularly attractive to 
China since it would likely promote the economic development of frontier regions 
inhabited by minority nationalities (Gao and Yu 2009). 
If currency mismatch can be mitigated, the potential benefits of reduced 
transaction costs would be even more evident (Park and Shin 2009). 
2) Seigniorage: raised by both Ito (20 11) and Cohen (20 11) as a benefit to the 
tssuer of an internationalized currency. Cohen describes Seigniorage as a 
macroeconomic benefit and a real-resource gam for the economy as a whole. 
Seigniorage is defined as the difference between the lower rate of interest paid on 
foreign assets acquired by the issuing country and the higher rate of interest paid by 
foreigners on assets denominated in their own currency. This difference brings gains 
in international Seigniorage to the issuer of an internationalized currency (Aliber 
1964). 
However, the benefits of Seigniorage are not risk free. Issuers of 
internationalized currencies may be hurt by offshore speculation, currency rush flow 
back, and loss of control of the Central Bank's monetary policy though (Ito 2011). 
3) Macroeconomic flexibility: Issuers of an internationalized currency benefit 
from the government's increased ability to pursue objectives, fmance external deficits, 
and delay adjusted costs. This not only brings economic advantages such as more 
latitude in managing price behaviour and employment levels, but it also enables 
issuers to fulfill their military and foreign diplomatic interests, as well (Cohen 20 12b ). 
International borrowing ability in the domestic currency helps to offset the currency 
mismatch20 problem in which Asian emerging countries were caught during the 1997 
Asia financial crisis (Dobson and Masson 2009; Genberg 2010). 
4) Leverage: Hard power, the autonomy that derives from macroeconomic 
flexibility, is vital to creating a capacity for leverage over others (Cohen 2012b). 
5) Reputation is a form of "soft power" which is promoted by the widespread 
20 Eichengreen B., Hausmann R. , Panizza U. ' Currency Mismatches, Debt Intolerance, and Original 
Sin Why They Are Not the Same and Why It Matters ': 122 May2007 Source: 
http :/ /www.nber.org/chapters/cO 150 
international use of the currency. It is also a visible sign of elevated rank in the 
community of nations, and a source of status and prestige brought by circulation 
(Cohen 2012). 
6) Reduced Cost of Capital: A sixth point is that the international demand for 
the RMB would increase business for China's domestic financial institutions, thus 
creating liquidity (Chen and Peng 2009). The competitiveness of domestic financial 
institutions would increase by dealing in the countries ' own currency (Chinn and 
Frankel 2005). Lower costs of capital could be provided to the non-financial sector as 
the financial sector becomes more profitable (Kenen 2009). 
7) Maintain the Value of Reserves: As China holds the largest amount of 
foreign exchange reserves in the world; the decrease in the value of foreign exchange 
reserves has lead to China's huge capital loss. With the internationalization of the 
RMB, China would be able to preserve the value of its foreign exchange reserves if its 
United States debts are denominated in the RMB (Gao and Yu (2009) and Ito (201 0)). 
3.2 Costs 
The costs China is likely to experience due to internationalization of the RMB 
are set out below. 
1) Appreciation- the popularity of an internationalized RMB would bring a 
degree of currency overvaluation. This would damage the benefits of China' s 
exporters by decreasing their competitiveness (Cohen 2011). This is particularly 
serious for China since its economy is heavily dependent on exports, and its 
aggressive exchange rate policy has resulted in the RMB being "moderately 
undervalued". 21 Conversely, Pettis (2013) argues that a seller's losses due to an 
undervalued currency are locked in when a transaction is completed in that currency. 
Accounting for these real losses, however, occurs only when the currency is re-valued 
correctly. From that perspective, the longer a currency remains undervalued, the 
more losses will accumulate for future recognition. 
2) External constraint- Two main risks are involved here: one is the instability 
of aggregate demand for the currency caused by volatile movements in and out the 
currency. The other risk is the currency's future value and usefulness will hold 
domestic policy increasingly hostage to external factors. Macroeconomic flexibility, 
domestic monetary autonomy and domestic priorities would be compromised if the 
RMB becomes an international currency (Cohen 2011). China might not be able to 
sustain volatile movements since its fmancial market is still vulnerable, and it is not 
sure that the Chinese government will be willing to adjust its domestic policy in 
response to external factors. 
3) Policy responsibility-The issuing country will find itself responsible for the 
global monetary structure and broader regional management. To contain a crisis or to 
provide subsidized loans to rescue some country in distress, the country's monetary 
policy may have to be modified (Cohen 2011). 
4) Capital control reduction- If China were to succeed in internationalizing 
the RMB, it would have to substantially reduce capital controls (Gao and Yu 2009). 
The government has to give up its control on both the cost and allocation of capital 
(Chovanec in Guilford 2013). Which would increase the potential for instability in an 
over-monetized, inflexible economy with shallow capital markets (Gao and Yu 2009). 
2 1 Washington Post, June 8, 2012 
5) Vulnerability to speculative currency attacks-An internationalized RMB 
would be more vulnerable to speculative currency attacks. Large amounts of capital 
could flow quickly in and out the country more easily . While this is theoretically 
feasible, smaller and independent currencies are far more vulnerable to this kind of 
attack. It is unlikely that this would be a serious strategic issue for China given the 
size of its economy, but it is possible that short-term mini crises could require active 
management by China (Gao and Yu 2009). 
According to the above analysis, it cannot be quantified whether the potential 
benefits regarding the internationalization of the RMB outweigh the potential costs or 
vice versa. However, as long as the Chinese government is willing to absorb the costs, 
or to shore up its weakness to avoid some of the costs, the internationalization process 
is likely to bring many political and economic gains to China. Among the above costs, 
the thorniest ones for China to consider are speculative currency attacks and external 
constraints, both of which would be likely to reveal weakness in China's fmancial and 
political system. Thus, the success of RMB internationalization depends on the ability 
and willingness of the government to face the challenges and cede certain controls on 
capital and financial market. 
3.3 The path of RMB internationalization 
China can follow two different path of RMB internationalization: one IS a 
global strategy, and the other is a regional one (Park, 2010). The former choice is 
compared with the experience of the US dollar, while the path taken by the euro was 
regional. 
3.3.1 Global approach to RMB internationalization 
"China may not have to participate in any regional monetary union to attain 
the economic financial scale that is a prerequisite for an international or global reserve 
currency. Instead of trying to emulate the European approach to a regional monetary 
union, all it has to do is to wait" (Eichengreen in Park, 2010). Following this 
approach, the RMB could become a global currency over time through economic 
growth and reform of Chinese financial markets. Chinese policy to date implies that 
China's decision makers prefer this approach. Waiting would require less overt action, 
but it would likely take a lot longer, and in the meantime, the global economic 
environment is continuously changing. 
According to the World Economic Forum (in Park 2010), China is at the 
bottom of the ranking of East Asian economies in terms of the degrees of capital 
account liberalization and domestic financial market liberalization. This means China 
would require a considerable time to internationalize the RMB. 
Though the global approach would be a slow and challenging path to take, the 
RMB can take a gradual approach towards this goal. Graph 2 below elaborated by 
HSBC sets out a three-stage process that the RMB could take if it is in pursuit of a 
global approach. It describes a path that begins with achieving the status as a top 
global trading currency; progresses to reaching the status of a top global investment 
currency; fmally culminating in a role as a top global reserve currency. 
Graph 1. RMB internationalization 3 stage process 
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Whether the regional approach would be a viable option depends on the 
regional role of the RMB. It is reasonable to think that as the neighbouring countries 
develop deeper trade, investment and financial ties with China, they will be more 
likely to use the RMB for transactions and as a reserve currency. Park (2010) suggests 
that China might move in the creation of an RMB bloc among the members of 
ASEAN+New 3. It would include ASEAN 10, the Chinese Mainland, Taiwan and 
Hong Kong SAR, using ASEAN+ 3 as a framework for RMB internationalization 
(ASEAN+3 approach). The size of the Chinese economy will favour China in forming 
a RMB bloc and helping China deepen monetary cooperation and financial integration 
in East Asia and make the RMB the dominant unit of account and store of value in the 
region (Park 201 0). 
Some economists, such as Mason and Dobson, (in Park, 201 0) believe that the 
bloc formation might be the most realistic and expedient approach to adopt for 
Chinese policy-makers. There are, however, 3 problems regarding the regionalization 
of the RMB: 1) It hasn't been evaluated whether ASEAN+New 3 is an optimal 
currency area, and even it is one, the Euro hasn't been a good example of 
regionalization creating advantages since most of the member countries are not 
performing better than before the forming Euro zone. 2) The traditional criteria for 
membership in a common currency monetary union can be an endogenous process 
rather than a contractual one (Frankel and Rose 1998 in Park 201 0). 3) Though is it is 
true that economic and fmancial interaction between the Asian countries is improved 
and deepened, so far there does not appear to be a strong interest by either China or 
neighbouring countries in forming an optimal currency area. 
This paper argues that the RMB has a long journey to take towards 
internalization, and there are many challenges to overcome before realizing that end. 
However, in the long term, the global approach appears to be more suitable for the 
RMB. Besides that, the idea of regionalizing the RMB may have originated in China's 
bilateral swap agreements with Asian neighbor countries. This idea may have gained 
support as a result of the more intensely fmancial and trading interaction between 
countries within Asian, and with the RMB being increasingly used by neighboring 
countries. However, none of this necessarily means that RMB internationalization is 
driving the formation of an Asian version of the "Euro". It actually refers more to the 
idea that the RMB 's next stage could be acting as a core currency in Asia, as they see 
it as an effective way in the post-crisis era to protect Asian countries from potential 
financial risks (Qu 201 0). It may also refer to the fact that the Chinese authorities 
want to consolidate the regional fmancial architecture more broadly than the 
framework provided by the Chang Mai initiative (Yu 20 12). 
ASEAN members are likely to be reluctant to allow their currenctes to 
appreciate with the RMB, thus causing their losing of competitiveness compared to 
the RMB. Using a regional currency would bind the member countries to the same 
monetary policy, forcing them to manage their economic differences using only their 
own fiscal policies. Not only does this appear to be more difficult if one takes the 
Eurozone as an example, but it creates problems in coordinating related economic and 
political policies within the region. It is also unclear how many ASEAN members are 
prepared to sacrifice some of their monetary sovereignty by anchoring their currencies 
to the RMB. The idea of regionalization would require further planning or discussion 
and evident willingness of cooperation. This would require more trust between Asia 's 
main countries than has been evident (Zhang 2010). 
3.4 Policy implications and suggestions 
To expedite progress of the RMB towards internationalization the following 
policies are recommended. 
1) Reform domestic financial markets and institutions in order to 
improve their transparency and efficiency. Deepen China's capital 
market by raising the investment limit for sovereign-wealth funds 
and central banks investing in domestic stocks and bonds, and by 
allowing more foreign investment, and deepen and liquidize its 
bond market in similar ways . This would greatly improve the 
RMB 's lagging performance along the financial track. 
2) Continue with the expansion and development of the RMB offshore 
markets to improve the RMB's already substantial progress on the 
trade track. In the short term, China must be able to control the 
inflow and outflow of capital between the two markets to avoid 
increasing opportunities for arbitrage as reform progresses. 
3) Accelerate the transition from controlled exchange and interest 
rates to market-based rates; which are not only crucial steps in 
reducing opportunities for arbitrage and currency speculation, but 
also important factors that determine the openness of financial 
markets and RMB convertibility. 
4) Rebalance China's economy away from export driven into 
consumption driven. The government should transfer more benefits 
and assets to the household sector, while unemployment should be 
kept low and household income should grow faster than, GDP 
(Pettis 2013). This would create a more sustainable growth model 
and economic environment to assist suggestions 1), 2) and 3). 
5) Clarify the government ' s long-term intentions and publish a 
roadmap towards full capital liberalization; which also contains the 
clarification of whether the RMB is going to take the regional or 
the global path; 
Chapter 4: Conclusion 
4.1 Summary of this research and main findings 
The Chinese government has successfully taken the initiative to promote steps 
conducive to the internationalization of the RMB through the issuance of bonds in the 
Hong Kong offshore market and through the establishment of cross border trade 
settlement in RMB. The success of the RMB internationalization on the trade track 
has been obvious, but the financial track needs further improvements. 
A comparison among major international currencies and the RMB shows the 
dominant role taken by the US dollar. It also shows the gloomy situation of the Euro 
as a failing or perhaps failed example of regionalization, the failure of the 
internationalization of the Yen, and the limited role-played so far by the RMB. 
However, since the Euro started to circulate in the international market, the role of the 
US dollar has been challenged. Thus, the RMB has an opportunity to play an 
increasingly important role as an international currency once it becomes fully 
convertible. 
The comparison reveals the complexity of currency internationalization in 
terms of history, politics and economics and the unique context for RMB 
internationalization. Barriers to internationalization of the RMB include its non-
convertibility, China's underdeveloped and closed financial market, the vagueness and 
uncertainty of the path it might take, and the rapidly changing global economic 
environment. A critical step before liberalizing its fmancial market is the reform of 
China's domestic institutions. This would help to minimize China's vulnerability to 
short term volatility and loss of control. 
In order to maximize the success and benefits from RMB internationalization, 
the Chinese government must clearly state its willingness to absorb the costs and give 
up some of the controls on not only capital flows, but across the financial system. At 
the same time, it should also focus on rebalancing China's entire economy to create a 
strong foundation for reform and internationalization. It seems that the ideal time to 
fully liberalize China's financial market and complete RMB internationalization 
process would be after most of these adjustments have been completed. 
Furthermore, the offshore market for RMB to be developed further. Interest 
and exchange rate reform must be coordinated with development so as to minimize 
opportunities for arbitrage behavior between onshore and offshore markets. 
China must clarify its intentions about which approach it has chosen -
regional or global - and the path it intends to follow for internationalizing the RMB. 
Of critical importance is that it must not only describe, but also visibly act on policies 
supporting this. As to this research, the global approach is a more optimal choice for 
China to take, and the eventual goal for the Chinese government should be to make 
the RMB an international currency that can create a tripartite confrontation together 
with the Euro and the US dollar. 
4.2 Trend and speed of RMB Internationalization in the near future 
In the near future , the move towards RMB internationalization would be 
continuous progress on its trade track, aided by China's large trade output. 
Meanwhile, since the financial track is far more important and essential than the trade 
track, it is expected that more policies related to the fmancial track will be launched to 
accomplish the gradual process . of fmancial liberalization. It is a good sign that 
China's new leaders have spoken energetically about tackling challenges facing RMB 
internationalization. Their statements suggest the Chinese leadership is aware of how 
painful and hard that reform is likely to be - described by Premier Li as "like cutting 
one's own wrist'.22. This talk must be supported by action before many will be 
convinced of its sincerity. 
The Chinese government will continue to experiment with new policies and 
strategies in the offshore market. This allows the government access to trial and error, 
learning from experience without taking great risks. To promote the RMB as an 
international reserve currency, efforts are likely to be made to have the RMB included 
in the IMF's SDR basket in its next review in 2015. To increase the likelihood of 
success, it is expected that the Chinese government will try to deal with the issue of 
the RMB's non-fully convertibility. 
The speed of the RMB internationalization will be gradual and cautious, not 
only because of the Chinese government's unwillingness to suddenly open up its 
financial market, but also because the government may try to reform the country's 
financial system before it takes further big steps like capital account liberalization. 
In the short term, the RMB will still play a limited role internationally, which 
implies that it will still be mainly used in trading fields . Since the internationalization 
path has not be clarified and related concrete changes have not begun, announcement 
of intentions and policy studies are not yet taken as real reforms. Until China makes 
its intentions clear, its policies concrete, and shows real progress on reforms, the 
RMB 's position and attractiveness will not be powerful enough to challenge the US 
dollar and the Euro, or perhaps not even the Pound and the Japanese Yen in the short 
term. 
22 The telegraph 'China's new premier Li Keqiang 'to cut state control over economy' 
www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/china-business/9936059/Chinas-new-premier-Li-Keqiang-to-cut-state-
control-over-economy.html 
4.3 What can be further done in studying this issue 
Since China has not announced a clear plan and path towards RMB 
internationalization, studies can be undertaken to find out whether China has 
implicitly adopted the RMB internationalization path. 
Another meaningful study that could be undertaken 1s a quantitative and 
qualitative mixed detailed costs benefits analysis to estimate whether the costs to 
China outweigh the expected benefits, or vice versa. Many researchers have written 
about the costs and benefits of having an internationalized currency, but since most of 
this writing is based on only a few examples, their conclusions might not apply to 
China's unique situation. Further, the discussion about costs and benefits has not been 
supported by analysis of whether the benefits outweigh the costs or vice versa. 
Further studies can be done on whether currency internationalization can be 
realized without capital liberalization. There are few examples of currency 
internationalization. As stated in previous chapters, by the time they internationalized 
their currency the issuing countries ' financial markets had already been liberalized, 
but this cannot be taken as proof that the capital account liberalization is a must for 
internationalizing a currency. As China has used Hong Kong as an experiment to keep 
both its closed onshore market under control, and an offshore market to initiate 
activities that promote the internationalization path, this unique model may yield 
evidence of its feasibility. 
An important analysis required is the extent to which Asia makes up an 
optimal currency zone. This could be conducted by comparing the region to relevant 
optimal currency theory and models. This may provide important evidence towards a 
defmite and accurate conclusion about whether the regional approach or the global 
approach is more suitable for China to take. 
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Appendix 
-8 
Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER) (continued) 
(In minions of U.S. dollars) 
2003 2004 I 2005 I 2006 I 2001 I 2008 I 2009 2010 1 2011 
World 
Total foreign 3,024,664 3,747,955 4,319,959 5,252,907 6,704,205 7,345,786 8,164,052 9,264,235 10,203,923 
exchange holdings 
Allocated reserves 2,223,206 2,655,173 2,843,626 3,315,544 4,119,361 4,210,258 4,590,412 5,161 ,83 1 5,642,052 
1/ 
Claims in U.S . I ,465,754 1,751 ,012 1,902,535 2,171 ,065 2,64 1,657 2,698,599 2,847,572 3,191 ,655 3,502,169 
dollars 
Claims in pounds 61 ,655 89,457 102,243 145,205 192,675 168,794 194,904 203 ,015 216,921 
sterling 
Claims in ... ... ... .. . ... ... ... ... . .. 
Deutsche mark 
Claims in French ... ... ... .. . ... ... .. . . .. 
francs 
Claims in Japanese 87,608 101 ,787 101 ,769 102,051 120,480 131 ,90 1 132,994 188,770 202,629 
yen 
Claims in Swiss 5,016 4,419 4,143 5,685 6,395 5,799 5,300 6,629 16,373 
francs 
Claims in ... ... ... ... ... .. . .. . . .. 
Netherlands 
guilder 
Claims in ECUs ... ... .. . .. . .. . ... .. . ... 
Claims in euros 559,340 658,634 683,893 832,018 1,082,376 1,112,287 1,269,590 1,342,492 1,407,036 
Claims in other 43,833 49,865 49,04 1 59,520 75,778 92,878 140,053 229,27 1 296,922 
currencies 
Unallocated 801,458 1,092,782 1,476,334 1,937,363 2,584,845 3,135,528 3,573,640 4,102,404 4,561 ,87 1 
reserves 2/ 
Advanced economies 
Total foreign 1,766,733 2,070,549 2,078,490 2,252,532 2,432,208 2,491 , 193 2,778,625 3,092,204 3,398,638 
exchange holdings 
Allocated reserves 1,557, 148 1,825,781 1,82 1,599 1,982,264 2,157,080 2,197,678 2,429, 109 2,708,457 3,012,032 
1/ 
Claims in U.S. 1,045,038 1,227,839 1,261 ,105 1,350,325 1,423,433 1,475,598 1,581 ,750 1,761 ,725 1,989,05 1 
dollars 
Claims in pounds 36,338 48,421 49,831 64,719 76,02 1 59,055 67,739 68,152 77,246 
sterling 
Claims in ... .. . ... .. . ... .. . .. . . .. . .. 
Deutsche mark 
Claims in French ... ... .. . 
francs 
Claims in Japanese 80,512 90,764 86,263 84,197 85,2 15 93,545 94,922 120,656 130,842 
yen 
Claims in Swiss 4,158 3,247 3,428 4,579 4,72 1 3,955 4,511 5,198 14,633 
francs 
Claims in ... .. . ... .. . .. . . .. ... 
Netherlands 
guilder 
Claims in ECUs ... . .. ... .. . .. . .. . . .. 
Claims in euros 359,079 417,198 387,038 440,455 522,190 5 11 ,245 616,432 646,720 685,752 
Claims in other 32,023 38,311 33 ,935 37,990 45,501 54,281 63,755 106,005 114,509 
currencies 
Unallocated 209,585 244,769 256,89 1 270,268 275 ,127 293,515 349,516 383,747 386,605 
reserves 2/ 
Emer2inl! and developin2 economies 
Total foreign 1,257,931 1,677,406 2,24 1,469 3,000,376 4,27 1,998 4,854,593 5,385,426 6,172,030 6,805,285 
exchange holdings 
Allocated reserves 666,058 829,393 1,022,027 1,333,280 1,962,280 2,012,580 2, 16 1,303 2,453,374 2,630,0 19 
1/ 
Claims in U.S. 420,717 523,172 641 ,431 820,741 1,21 8,224 1,223,001 1,265,822 1,429,929 1,513, 118 
dollars 
Claims in pounds 25,317 41 ,036 52,4 13 80,487 116,654 109,738 127,164 134,863 139,675 
sterling 
Claims in ... ... ... ... ... ... .. . ... . .. 
Deutsche mark 
Claims in French ... ... ... ... ... ... ... . .. 
francs 
Claims in Japanese 7,095 11 ,023 15,506 17,854 35,265 38,356 38,072 68, 11 3 71,788 
yen 
Claims in Swiss 858 1, 172 715 1,106 1,675 1,845 789 1,431 1,74 1 
francs 
Claims in .. . ... ... .. . .. . .. . .. . . .. 
Netherlands 
guilder 
Claims in ECUs ... ... ... .. . ... . .. .. . ... . .. 
Claims in euros 200,261 241 ,436 296,855 391,563 560,186 601 ,042 653,158 695,772 721 ,285 
Claims in other 11 ,810 11 ,554 15,106 2 1,530 30,277 38,597 76,298 123 ,266 182,413 
currencies 
Unallocated 591 ,873 848,014 1,219,443 1,667,096 2,309,717 2,842,013 3,224,123 3,718,656 4,175,266 
reserves 2/ 
Memorandum Items 
Exchange Rates (End of Period) 
Pound sterling per 0.5603 0.5 178 0.5808 0.5094 0.4992 0.6860 0.617 0.639 0.647 
U.S. dollar 
Japanese yen per 107.1000 104.1200 117.9700 118.9500 114.0000 90.7500 92.060 81.450 77.720 
U.S. dollar 
Swiss franc per 1.2369 1.131 6 1.3143 1.2203 1.1 255 1.0637 1.031 0.940 0.941 
U.S. dollar 
Euro per U.S. 0.7918 0.7342 0.8477 0.7593 0.6793 0.7185 0.6942 0.7484 0.7729 
dollar 
